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RONALD J. BACIGAL
Post-Whalen Double Jeopardy in Virginia*
THE constitutional prohibition against double jeop-
ardyI serves three distinct purposes: (1) prohibition of a
second prosecution after acquittal; (2) prohibition of a
second prosecution after conviction; and (3) prohibi-
tion of multiple punishments for the same offense.2
This article addresses the problem of defining "the
same offense," and specifically focuses on the applica-
tion of the Blockburger3 test in light of Whalen v.
United States.4
The Blockburger test applies to situations where one
transaction violates two or more criminal statutes. If
each statutory provision requires proof of a fact which
the other does not, there exist separate and distinct
offenses which may be punished separately. E.g., com-
mon law burglary requires proof of the breaking and
entry of a dwelling, while a larceny committed in the
dwelling requires proof of the separate element of tak-
ing and carrying away personal property. Multiple
punishments can be imposed. If, however, proof of one
offense requires proof of all of the elements of the other
offense, then the crimes stand in the relationship of a
lesser included offense and a greater offense, and the
double jeopardy provision normally bars imposition of
multiple punishment.' E.g., since robbery is larceny
from a person by force or intimidation, the elements of
larceny must always be proved in order to establish the
greater offense of robbery. Multiple punishments may
not be imposed. Whalen v. United States raises the
question of whether the court will apply the Block-
burger test to the generic statutory language defining
the multiple offenses, or to the facts alleged in a particu-
lar case. However, before considering the application of
the Blockburger test, it is necessary to identify two situa-
tions where the Virginia Supreme Court has held
Blockburger to be inapplicable.
I. The legislature clearly intends to impose multiple
punishments.
Until recently the United States Supreme Court had
"often hedged our bets with veiled hints that a legisla-
ture might offend the Double Jeopardy Clause by auth-
*The author presented the substance of this article at a regional
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orizing too many separate punishments for any single
Iact.' "" What was "hinted" at was that the double jeop-
ardy clause, like the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the Eighth Amendment, stood as a constitu-
tional limitation on the maximum punishment which
could be imposed. Concurring in Whalen, Justice
Blackmun took issue with the concept of the double
jeopardy clause as a limitation on the legislature's
authority to proscribe punishments and stated: "The
question of what punishments are constitutionally
permissible is not different from the question of what
punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be
imposed."6 The Supreme Court of Virginia was quick
to adopt this view of double jeopardy and thus antici-
pated the recent holding in A lbernaz v. United States.7
Albernaz recognized that if the double jeopardy
clause were viewed as a prohibition on legislative intent
to impose "too much" or "too many" punishments,
then the double jeopardy clause and the cruel and
unusual punishment clause were redundant. A lbernaz
adopted the view that the double jeopardy clause is not
a constitutional standard against which to measure
legislative intent because the power to define criminal
offenses and prescribe punishment resides wholly with
the legislature. Thus the Blockburger test functions
merely as "a rule of statutory construction and because
it serves as a means of discerning legislative purpose,
the rule should not be controlling where, for example,
there is a clear indication of contrary legislative
intent."'8
In Turner v. Commonwealth9 the defendant con-
tended that his conviction for use of a firearm in the
commission of a felony was a lesser included offense of
his conviction for murder in the commission of a
robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. If the
Blockburger test were applicable the defendant could
not be sentenced for both the lesser included and greater
offense. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's double jeopardy claim and held Block-
burger inapplicable because Virginia Code§ 18.2-53.110
"reflects an unambiguous intent to authorize multiple
punishment for a single criminal transaction." I Turner
establishes that if the legislature clearly indicates its
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desire to impose multiple punishments, it is immaterial
whether the punishments are based on a single offense
or separate offenses, thus the B lockburger test for defin-
ing separate offenses is inapplicable.
II. Blockburger is inapplicable where multiple offenses
arise from separate acts.
The Blockburger test starts from the premise that the
defendant has performed one act, and the relevant issue
is whether that act constitutes separate and distinct
offenses. If the premise is rebutted by establishing that
the defendant committed separate acts, then there is
nothing to trigger application of the Blockburger test.
E.g., if the defendant commits robbery on Monday and
again on Tuesday no one would seriously argue that
double jeopardy prohibits punishment for both robber-
ies. Thus a court need never consider the Blockburger
rule if all of the alleged offenses are seen as arising from
separate and distinct acts.
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the issue of
defining separate acts in two recent cases."2 In Jones v.
Commonwealth 3 the defendant robbed a hotel clerk of
the money in the hotel safe and then made his getaway
by obtaining the keys to the hotel courtesy car which
was located some 200 yards from the hotel. The defend-
ant contended that the larceny of the automobile was a
lesser included offense of robbery, thus Blockburger
would preclude punishment for both robbery and lar-
ceny. The court held that Blockburger was applicable
only when multiple articles are stolen "at one and the
same time."14 The facts in Jones, however, revealed that
"in terms of time and situs, the two thefts involved
separate and distinct acts of caption, and two different
sets of asportation."15
In Martin v. Commonwealth1 6 the court again dis-
tinguished a single transaction from separate acts by
considering spatial factors of time and distance. As
dissenting Chief justice I'Anson pointed out, the Mar-
tin majority may have been hairsplitting on the facts in
order to subdivide the defendant's course of conduct
into separate and distinct acts. In theory and in practice
there appear to be no limitations on a court's inclina-
tion to characterize a defendant's conduct as constitut-
ing separate acts. Consider this hypothetical: Defend-
ant approaches victim, points a gun and demands all of
the victim's valuables. The victim surrenders his wallet.
The defendant then cocks the gun and angrily shouts:
"I said all your valuables." The victim then surrenders
his wristwatch. The hypothetical can be seen as consti-
tuting two separate instances of robbery if the court
regards the cocking of the gun as a separate physical act
which produced further apprehension on the part of the
victim and resulted in an additional loss of property.
Focusing on spatial considerations permits any course
of conduct to be subdivided into an infinite number of
separate acts and thus leads to the type of hairsplitting
used in Martin. The alternative to spatial considera-
tions would involve examination of legislative intent
and thus would overlap with the Blockburger test.1 7
The application of the "Blockburger" test
If the court finds (1) an absence of clear legislative
intent to impose multiple punishments; and (2) that the
defendant's conduct constitutes a single transaction,
then the cout must apply Blockburger to determine if
that single transaction violates two criminal statutes
each of which require proof of a separate element.
Blockburger is relatively easy to apply to classic lesser
included and greater offenses. For example: Evidence of
assault with a deadly weapon necessarily requires proof
of the lesser included offense of simple assault. Block-
burger is not so easily applied to cases where the
defendant has been convicted of felony murder and the
underlying felony. Justice Rehnquist refers to these
types of offenses as predicate and compound offenses
rather than classic lesser included and greater offenses.
The distinction being that while it is impossible to
prove a greater offense without first proving the lesser
included offense, the compound offense of felony
murder can be proved by establishing any one of a
number of alternative predicate felonies.' 8
When Blockburger is applied to felony murder the
result turns on whether the court considers the statutory
language which provides for alternative predicates, or
whether the court limits its consideration to the partic-
ular predicate felony alleged in the specific case. As
Justice Rehnquist stated:
If one applies the test in the abstract by look-
ing solely to the wording of ... the statutes
defining the various predicate felonies, Block-
burger would always permit imposition of
cumulative sentences, since no particular fel-
ony is ever "necessarily included" within a
violation of the felony murder statute. If, on
the other hand, one looks to the facts alleged
in a particular indictment ... then Block-
burger would bar cumulative punishment for
felony murder and the particular predicate
offense charged in the indictment, since proof
of the former would necessarily entail proof of
the latter. 19
Application of Blockburger to felony murder necessi-
tates a choice between examining the general wording
of a statute or the wording of a particular indictment.
The Whalen dissenters clearly opted for the language as
drafted by the legislature,20 but the majority denied that
they had chosen the opposite approach of focusing on
the language of the indictment.2' Thus Whalen did not
clearly resolve the question of whether the offenses
must be defined by statute or by the indictment.
The three Virginia cases closest in point reflect the
same uncertainty evidenced in Whalen. In Jones v.
Commonwealth22 the Virginia Supreme Court held
that "the crime of robbery and the crime of using a
firearm in committing robbery have different elements
as a matter of law, although they may have common
elements as a matter of fact." 2 3 While Jones disregarded
the specific facts and focused on the generic definitions
of the crimes, Harrison v. Commonwvealth2' and Simp-
son v. Commonwealth2 5 appear to take the opposite
approach and disregard general statements of law in
order to focus on the facts of the particular case. For
example, in Simpson the prosecution relied on the con-
cept of felony murder by alleging murder during the
commission of robbery. But in upholding convictions
of murder and robbery the Virginia Supreme Court
held that under the facts established at trial the convic-
tion of first degree murder could have been based, not
on felony murder, but on independent proof of pre-
meditation.
Given this inconsistency in Pre-Whalen precedent,
the Virginia Supreme Court had no clear guidance
when confronted with the issue left open in Whalen-
whether to apply Blockburger to the facts of the particu-
lar case, or to general statutory language. In its most
recent decision, Blythe v. Commonwealth,"5 the Court
acknowledged neither the inconsistency in Virginia
precedent nor the controversy that split the United
States Supreme Court in Whalen. The Virginia Su-
preme Court disposed of the issue in one sentence,
citing Whalen for the proposition that in applying
B lock burger "the two offenses are to be examined in the
abstract, rather than with reference to the facts of the
particular case under review." 2 7 It remains to be seen
whether this one sentence has definitely resolved the
question left open in Whalen,2 or whether the Virginia
Supreme Court is willing to consider and expound
upon the issue in some detail.
FOOTNOTES
1. "... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"; U.S. Const. Amend. V. See also,
Va. Const. art. I, § 8.
2. See generally, Westin & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of
Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Ct. Review 81.
3. Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
4. 100 S. Ct. 1432 (1980).
5. Id. at 1443. (Justice Rehnquist, dissenting).
6. Id. at 1441 (Justice Blackmun, concurring).
7. 101 S. Ct. 1137 (1981).
8. ld. at 1143.
9. 221 Va. 513 (1980).
10. § 18.2-53.1 Use or display of firearm in committing a felony,
provides in pertinent part: "Violation of this section shall constitute a
separate and distinct felony.... [P]unishment shall be separate and
apart from, and shall be made to run consecutively with, any pun-
ishment received for the commission of the primary felony."
1I. Turner v. Commonwealth, supra note 9 at 530.
12. In addition to double jeopardy considerations, the question of
identifying "separate" acts arises under Va. Code § 19.2-294 which
provides in pertinent part: "If the same act be a violation of two or
more statutes... conviction under one of such statutes ... shall be a
bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or others."
13. 218 Va. 757 (1978).
14. Id. at 761.
15. Id.
16. 221 Va. 720 (1981).
17. See Whalen v. United States, supra note 4, at 1442. (Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting).
18. In Virginia felony murder can arise during the commission of
arson, rape, robbery, burglary or abduction. Va. Code § 18.2-52.
(continued on page 26)
envelope, a return receipt post card, or a typed
check on a television screen. Typewriters using TV
displays are excellent tools for text editing applica-
tions because you are working with only one kind
of paper stock in your printing unit. But when you
are working with an intermix of different kinds of
paper stock a stand-alone automatic typewriter
that prints directly onto its roller may be more
versatile.
Myth: By measuring the quantity of output (lines pro-
duced, etc.) you can judge the effectiveness of your
word processing staff.
Reality: You can measure only the quantitative aspects
of your staff's productivity. The qualitative aspects
can only be judged. Word processing jobs are an
intermix of both quantitative and qualitative fac-
tors, and many of the qualitative ones are in noway
reflected by measuring output. These include such
abilities as the capacity to resolve ambiguous,
illegible or unclear dictation, to make intelligent
format decisions, to determine the correct variable
information to be added onto prerecorded mate-
rials without having to be told, to select the correct
paper stock when it has not been indicated, or even
when it has been indicated incorrectly, to prepare
the customary number of carbon copies even
though no copies were called for, to know when to
consult a dictionary, to be able to handle basic
correspondence on one's own, etc. Above all, we
need to have secretarial help that is capable of
understanding how automatic typing equipment
can be made to do all the jobs it's able to do, and
how to design documents and encode magnetic
media appropriately. What's really devastating is
that the clock watching, line counting, timekeep-
ing efficiency experts with their quantity think-
ing, may in fact be screening out of the word pro-
cessing environment the kind of quality support
staff we most need in it.
Myth: The one-lawyer-one-secretary arrangement is
ineffective and must be replaced.
Reality: What's wrong with the one-lawyer-one-secre-
tary arrangement is that it's unthought about.
Under some circumstances it may in fact be
extremely effective. Where it is, it should be
retained; where it's not, it should be replaced. But
what's really important is that you ought to be
thinking about alternatives. You might get some
good ideas about ways to regroup your support
people in my article "An Easy and Effective Way to
Reorganize Your Law Office for Automation." For
a free copy, send a self-addressed envelope marked
with the title and stamped with postage for two
ounces to me at 5 Hawke Lane, Rockville Centre,
New York 11570.
What is ultimate reality? Perhaps it's that there is no
one in charge of methods. Each lawyer and secretary do
their thing in their own way. Sometimes well, some-
times poorly, sometimes differently than the time
before. Perhaps it's that no one thinks about how each
job could have been done better, and no one asks how
the best method could be institutionalized. Perhaps it's
that no one cares about efficiency. Perhaps we delude
ourselves with the belief that we somehow offer a service
so unique that its efficient delivery is of no conse-
quence. Perhaps that will some day be seen as the ulti-
mate myth.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Mr. Sternin has written extensively on
woMi processing and related subjects. His works include
the article "The Bottom Line: Document Design," copies
of which may be obtained by writing to Mr. Sternin at 5
Hawkc Lane, Rockville Centre, New York, N.Y. 11570.
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